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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
FREED FINANCE COMPANY, a Utah
Corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
STOKER MOTOR COMPANY, a Utah
Case No.
Corporation; ROLAND E. G I N S BURG and JAMES A. KOHN; UTAH
13925
STATE TAX C O M M I S S I O N ;
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA;
and A T E X INCORPORATED, a
Utah Corporation,
Defendants and Appellants.
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Mortgage foreclosure suit.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
District Court granted summary judgment in favor of
the plaintiff-respondent.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant Stoker Motor Company is seeking to vacate summary judgment and remand case for trial.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about November 8, 1969, the Appellant executed and delivered to Respondent a promissory note in
the amount of $400,000.00 payable to the Respondent
(R-l). As security for the payment of said notei, the Appellant on the same day executed and delivered to the
Respondent a mortgage, by which the Appellant mortgaged to the Respondent the property which is the subject matter of this case (R-l). The said note and mortgage were executed by the Appellant's president, Harold
D. Stoker. The Appellant defaulted in the payment of
said note.
The Appellant thereafter by and through its president, Harold D. Stoker, executed and delivered to the
Respondent an Agreement dated July 31, 1973 (R-12).
By virtue of said Agreement the Appellant again acknowledged the $400,000.00 note and mortgage payable by
the Appellant to the Respondent. As part of the said
Agreement the Appellant agreed to pay a certain monthly
payment on the note. It was agreed to by the parties
that if the Appellant was in default that it would have
sixty days from notice thereof to coorrect the default. The
Appellant was in default under the terms and conditions
of the Agreement and the Respondent gave notice to the
Appellant of its default and demanded payment. No payment was made and the Respondent instituted this foreclosure action. The District Court granted summary
judgment to the Respondent and entered its decree of
foreclosure on November 15, 1974. Pursuant to notice
a sheriff's sale was held in Tooele County on the 31st
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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day of January, 1975. A certificate of sale was issued
on the same date to Respondent. A receiver was appointed by the District Court on January 31, 1975, to
take possession of the property pending the statutory
redemption period.
ARGUMENT
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN
FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENT AND IN
ENTERING ITS DECREE OF FORECLOSURE.
Rule 56C says that a motion for summary judgment
shall be rendered "forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show thlalt
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law." Rule 56 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Material facts in this case are not in dispute.
There is no dispute over the fact that the Appellant's
president, Harold D. Stoker, signed and executed and
delivered to the Respondent the note and mortgage upon
which this action is based. There is no dispute as to the
contents of the note and mortgage, i.e., that the note is
for $400,000.00 and that it is secured by certain real property which is described in the mortgage. There is no
dispute, furthermore, that the note and mortgage were
in default and that the Appellant Stoker Motor Com-
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pany did not meet its obligations undeor the note and was
therefore in default. There is no dispute that an Agreement was entered into between the Appellant and the
Respondent on July 31, 1973. And in that Agreement the Appellant acknowledged the $400,000.00 note
and all indebtedness due to the Respondent. There is no
dispute that the Appellant was in default under the terms
of this Agreement and that pursuant to said default the
Respondent gave notice on January 7,1974 declaring this
Agreement in default and giving the Appellant sixty days
in which to cure the default. There is no dispute over
the fact that the Appellant failed to cure the default
within sixty days and as a result the foreclosure action
was instituted. The District Court correctly held that
there were no material issues of fact with regard to this
note and mortgage and that the Respondent was entitled
to a summary judgment as a matter of law. The Appellant in its brief is attempting to remand this case for
trial so that other cases cited on page two of Appellant's
brief can be considered by the Trial Court on remand of
this case. The Appellant is trying to incorporate these
previous cases into this matter before the Court and say
that because issues of fact niay exist in those cases those
same issues of fact exist in this case. This foreclosure
action was started by the Respondent as a separate action
and is based on the exhibits attached to the Respondent's
complaint, i.e., the note and mortgage. The Respondent
filed its motion for summary judgment and attached to
that motion an affidavit of David Freed and a copy of
the July 31, 1973 Agreement. The 1973 Agreement con-
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sititutes an admission by the Appellant of the allegations
contained in the Respondent's complaint in this action,
i.e., that the Appellant Stoker Motor Company executed
a promissory note in the principal amount of $400,000.00
payable to Freed by Stokers, secured by a second mortgage on certain real property situated in Tooele County,
State of Utah; that the Appellant Stoker Motor Company
owed several accounts to the Respondent as enumerated
in the Agreement; that tihe Respondent owed the Appellant Stoker Motor Company no money as claimed in the
Appellant's answer on file herein. In this July 31, 1973
Agreement Stokers agreed to pay a certain monthly payment on the note in question. It was agreed to by the
parties that if Stokers were in default they should have
sixty days from notice thereof to correct the default. The
Appellant Stoker Motor Company was in default under
the terms and conditions of the Agreement and as stated
in the affidavit of David Freed on file herein, on January
7, 1974 the Respondent gave notice to the Appellant of
its default and demanded payment. It is interesting to
note that in the Agreement Stokers acknowledged and
admitted owing to the Respondent on several accounts
approximately $56,030.00. This admitted indebtedness of
the Appellant to the Respondent corresponds with the
indebtedness which the Respondent complained of in the
four cases cited on page two of the Appellant's brief. This
fact is admitted on page seven of the Appellant's brief
wherein the Appellant says "It is clear that the Agreement of July 31, 1973 was intended to compromise and
settle the claim asserted by plaintiff aganist Stoker in
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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this case, as well as plaintiff's claims in the four Salt
Lake County cases." The Appellant admits that the July
31, 1973 Agreement constitutes a compromise settlement
of the claims between the Respondent and the Appellant.
The Appellant also claims there is an unresolved accounting due from the Respondent to the Appellant. The Appellant claims that because no accounting was reached
in these previous four cases that there are disputed issues
of fact. The Appellant has admitted that no factual issue
exaste with respect to these four cases by saying that the
July 31, 1973 Agreement settled the claims in the "four
Salt Lake County cases." It should be noted also that
Appellant has had ample opportunity to seek the relief
it claims it is entitled to in these previous four cases.
The Appellant's Pbint III that the unresolved accounting
precludes summary judgment is totally without merit,
therefore, and the Appellant cannot now claim that factual issues which may have existed in those cases should
be considered by this Court in reversing the District
Court's decision granting summary judgment to the Respondent. Furthermore if the Appellant desires an accounting he is not precluded from filing a separate action
for an accounting.
The record before the Court does support the summary judgment awarded. The action brought by the Respondent was a foreclosure action foreclosing on its security for the $400,000.00 note which was signed and executed by the Appellant's president, Harold D. Stoker.
The note was in default and the Appellant has not disputed that fact. There is no question but that the real
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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property which was the subject of the mortgage was delivered as security for the note. The only defenses asserted by the Appellant at the District Court were legal
defenses which were properly considered in the District
Court. The District Court properly decided that there
were no material issues of fact and that the Appellant
was entitled to a summary judgment as a matter of law.
In the affidavit of H. D. Stoker, president of the Appellant, which affidavit was filed in opposition to Respondent's motion for summary judgment, there is no dispute
as to any of the material facts in this case (R-14). The
first four paragraphs of said affidavit are statements concerning Harold D. Stoker's authority to sign for and on
behalf of the Appellant. Paragraph five states a conclusion of law which is totally without merit. The Appellant
claims that the four cases sitiill pending in the District
Court of Salt Lake County must be resolved before the
amount of indebtedness of the Appellant in this action
can be resolved. Paragraph six of the affidavit reiterates
the Appellant's position that an accounting between the
parties must be made before the indebtedness in this
law suit can be established. The Appellant has admitted
on page seven of its brief that the claims asserted in the
four Salt Lake County cases were compromised and settled by the July 31, 1973 Agreement. Even though it is
not clear the Appellant is attempting by paragraphs five
and six of the affidavit of H. D. Stoker to dispute the
amount of the indebtedness under the $400,000.00 note.
In the July 31,1973 Agreement, in paragraph three thereof, it says:
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"It is expressly understood and agreed that
in the event of the default of the first mortgage
held by Prudential Federal Savings and Loan
Association and/or default in the first mortgage
held by LeGrande 0. Jones and Margaret H.
Jones,, or default under the terras and conditions
of the first mortgage or in the terms and conditions of the first mortgage or in the terms and
<x>nditions of this Agreement, namely, the $56,030.00 and the $125,000.00 to be paid, Freed
shall notify Stoker in writing of such default and
they shall have sixty (60) days in which to correct the same. In the event the same is not corrected within sixty (60) days from notice thereof,
then this Agreement to be of no further force and
effect and the original amount set forth herein
shall be due and payable, together with attorney's fees."
This language expressly provides and the Appellant did
agree that if in default under the July 31, 1973 Agreement the original amount set forth therein, i.e., the
$400,000.00 and the $56,030.00 shall be due and payable,
together with attorney's fees. The Appellant is now estopped from asserting that it does not owe $400,000.00 as
expressed in the note to the Respondent. No other facts
have been disputed by the affidavit of Harold D. Stoker.
Rule 56 (e) says:
"When a motion for summary judgment is
made and supported as provided by this rule, an
adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in
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this rule, must set forth specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial."
The Appellant did not set forth specific facts in the affidavit sufficient to show that there was a genuine issue
for trial and on that basis the District Court properly
granted a summary judgment in favor of the Respondent.
The Appellant Stoker Motor Company claims that
the execution of the note and mortgage was not a duly
authorized act of the corporation. The July 31, 1973
Agreement is signed by Harold D. Stoker for the corporation, Stoker Motor Company. The Argument itself
verifies the existence and validity of the note and mortgage which were also signed by Harold D. Stoker for the
Appellant corporation. The affidavit of David Freed
attests to the fact that Harold D. Stoker at all times represented himself to be an agent and officer of the corporation duly authorized to execute said note and mortgage. Harold D. Stoker at the time he signed the note
and mortgage was president of the Appellant Stoker Motor Company. The note and mortgage attached as Exhibits A and B of Respondent's complaint show that there
is no material dispute as to the authority of Harold Stoker
(R-l). He signed the note, Exhibit A, as president of
the Appellant Stoker Motor Company. He signed the
mortgage, Exhibit B, as president of the Appellant corporation. The mortgage bears the corporate acknowledgment. The signing of the note and mortgage by a corporation's president is clearly within the apparent authority of Mr. Harold Stoker. A corporation will be bound
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by contracts or agreements of its agente if within the
apparent scope of the agent's authority. Lumber Mart
Company v. Buchanan, 69 Wash. 2d 658, 419 P. 2d 1002
(1966); Walker v. Pacific Mobile Home, Inc., 68 Wash.
2d 347, 413 P. 2d 3 (1966).
Furthermore, Utah Code Annotated, Section 16-10-6
(1973) says that:
"No act of the corporation and no conveyance or transfer of real . . . property . . . by a
poration shall be invalid by reason of the fact
that the corporation was without capacity or
power to do such act or to make . . . such conveyance or transfer,"
except in certain cases, none of which apply here. The
defense of ultra vires cannot by law be asserted by the
Appellant in this case. The defense of ultra vires was
asserted by the Appellant in its answers to the plaintiffs complaint (R-9). The Appellant cites Utah Code
Annotated, Section 16-10-74, for the proposition that in
order for a corporation to mortgage substantially all of
the assets of the corporation, that such acts be authorized
by the corporation's board of directors and be adopted
by a resolution of the stockholders. The Utah Supreme
Court has however in Grover v. Gam, 23 U. 2d 441, 464
P. 2d 598 (1970), held that a contract for sale of real
property executed by owners of substantially all of the
stock of the corporation was binding upon the corporation notwithstanding the fact that the seller had not complied with the procedure set forth in Section 16-10-74.
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The Grovers sold a dryfarm in Idaho to the Gains on a
contract. On the contract the seller appeared as a corporation Arthur N. Gxover Farms, Inc. and was signed
by the corporation's vice-president and attested to by
its secretary. The Trial Court found the Grovers were
bound by a contract as a corporation and individually.
On appeal the Grovers argued that the contract for sale
was invalid because it was not authorized by the board
of directors. The Supreme Court held the corporation
was bound by the contract even though there had been
no formal stockholders' meeting, and no resolution from
the board of directors. See also Amos v. Bervnion, 18 U.
2d 251, 420 P. 2d 47 (1966), where it was held that a
corporation is bound by the acts of its president. The
Appellant is estopped as a matter of law from now claiming its agent and president was not authorized to execute
the note and mortgage to the Respondent or that Harold
D. Stoker was not authorized to execute the July 31,1973
Agreement. It should also be mentioned that Utah Code,
Section 16-10-74 inures to the benefit of shareholders and
is not assertable by the corporation itself. U-Beva Mines
v. Toledo Mining Company, 24 U. 2d 351, 471 P. 2d 867
(1970). The court said in U-Beva:
"Toledo had no reason to believe that the
lease had not been authorized by the stockholders, or that such authorization was required because it was the only asset of the company,—
the latter fact not being completely established,
but only stated to be so by one of the U-Beva
officers—four years after the lease's execution,
and only after termination assarted." Id. at 869.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

12
The note and mortgage in this case were executed on
November 8, 1969 and a subsequent Agreement affirming
the note and mortgage was executed by the corporation
by the Appellant's president on July 31, 1973 and it was
not until this foreclosure action was instituted that the
Respondent had any reason to believe that the documents had not been authorized by the stockholders.
The Appellant also asserted in its answer to Respondent's complaint that the? Respondent waived and was
estopped from exercising its right to foreclose on the note
and mortgage in question. The facts are clear that Freed
gave the Appellant more than reasonable notice of its
intent to declare the balance in default and of its intention to foreclose. There can be no honest dispute that
the Respondent intended to exercise its rights under the
note and mortgage. The Respondent did not at any
time do anything which would constitute a waiver of its
right to foreclose. In Owen v. Mecham, 9 Ariz. 529, 454
P. 2d 577 (1966), it was held that the acceptance of late
payments did not constitute a waiver of the mortgagee's
right to foreclose. This same rule applies in Utah. In
American Savings and Loan Association v. Blomquist,
21 U. 2d 289,445 P. 2d 1 (1968), the Utah Supreme Court
held that where the mortgagee sent a letter to the mortgagor demanding strict performance of the payment provisions and giving notification of the amount due and
then seeking to collect the late charge, there was no
waiver of the mortgagee's right to accelerate the debt
where the existing delinquency remains uncured. Once
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Freed Finance Company notified the Appellant Stoker
Motor Company that the Appellant was in default, it
did nothing which could be construed as a waiver. The
Respondent gave the Appellant more than reasonable
notice of default and a reasonable opportunity to pay,
i.e., sixty days from and after receiving notification. The
Respondent is not estopped from assreting default. The
Appellant agreed to these terms on July 31, 1973 and
it cannot now say it was unreasonable.
The Agreement of July 31, 1973 and the affidavit of
David Freed and cases cited herein show that as a matter
of law the Respondent has not waived and is not estopped
from declaring the note in default and foreclosing on its
mortgage.
The Appellant on the other hand is estopped from
asserting that the note and mortgage were not supported
by legal, adequate and proper consideration. The note
and mortgage were signed November 8, 1969 by the Appellant's authorized representative to satisfy the Appellant's indebtedness to the Respondent. Again on July
31, 1973 the Appellant's same representative executed
the Agreement for and on behalf of the Appellant. Again
the debt was acknowledged and admitted by the Appellant. The note and mortgage were evidence of an indebtedness admitted by the Appellant. There is no issue as
to any material facts on this question. The Appellant received money from the Respondent and was indebted to
the Respondent at the time the Appellant executed the
note and mortgage.
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The Appellant is also estopped from now claiming
the note and mortgage were executed as a result of mutual
mistake as to the claimecl indebtedness of the Appellant
or that said indebtedness resulted from a misrepresentation by the Respondent to the Appellant as to the amount
of said indebtedness. Again the July 31, 1973 Agreement
speaks for itself. It constitutes an admission by the Appellant as to the amount of the indebtedness. The Appellant cannot now assert that it signed a note for
$400,000.00 and an Agreement three years later acknowledging said indebtedness, that it did not know how much
it owed to the Respondent.
SUMMARY
There are no issues as to any material facts in this
case and the Trial Court correctly granted summary judgment to Respondent as a matter of law. All disputed
factual issues have been admitted by virtue of the July
31, 1973 Agreement or settled by the affidavit of David
Freed on file herein and by the Appellant's admissions
in its brief herein. The Respondent respectfully asks this
Court to affirm the decision by the Trial Court granting
summary judgment to the Respondent.
Respectfully submitted,
W. Clark Burt and
Louis H. Callister, Sr.
800 Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Attorneys for
Plaintiff and Respondent
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